国际顶刊 |《美国政治科学杂志》2021年第1期
让每一个人自由地理解政治
让世界各地的学人成果互联互通
让政治学人的核心关切得到传播
让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空
政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了《美国政治科学杂志》2021年第1期文章编译。
编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。
PART 1
期刊简介
American Journal of Political Science（美国政治科学杂志）是美国中西部政治学协会（MPSA）旗下学术期刊，目前由威立出版社代为出版。创刊于1973年，出版周期为每年4期，收录与政治科学相关的所有子领域。IF：4.515，在176种政治科学期刊中排名第2.
期刊研究领域和收录范围包括：政治理论研究、政治学方法论、比较政治学、国际关系等。
PART 2
期刊目录
Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service
平权法案是否会使官僚机构表现恶化？来自印度行政部门的证据
Policy Diffusion: The Issue‐Definition Stage
政策扩散：问题定义阶段
Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking
取悦巨头：美国在世界银行政策制定中的影响力
The Real Winner's Curse
真正胜利者的诅咒
Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition
供应链联系与扩大的碳联盟
Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions
帮助朋友或影响敌人——竞选资金捐款的选举与政策影响
Elite Interactions and Voters’ Perceptions of Parties’ Policy Positions
精英互动和选民对政党政策立场的看法
Trade and Political Fragmentation on the Silk Roads: The Economic Effects of Historical Exchange between China and the Muslim East
丝绸之路的贸易与政治分裂：中国与东方伊斯兰世界之间历史交流的经济影响
Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information‐Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading?
政治信息与信息寻求行为中的政党分歧：动机性推理还是“啦啦队”？
Misgovernance and Human Rights: The Case of Illegal Detention without Intent
恶治与人权——无（压制性）意图非法拘禁的案例
Risk and Trouble: Adam Smith on Profit and the Protagonists of Capitalism
风险与麻烦——亚当·斯密论利润与资本主义的主角
What Motivates Reasoning? A Theory of Goal‐Dependent Political Evaluation
何者驱动论证？基于目标的政治评价理论
Political Scandal: A Theory
政治丑闻的一种理论
Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability
断层：官僚权力对选举问责制的影响
Labor Unions and White Racial Politics
工会与白人种族政治
State Visits and Leader Survival
国事访问与领导人生存
PART 3
精选译文
01 平权法案是否会使官僚机构表现恶化？来自印度行政部门的证据
【题目】
Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service
【作者】
Rikhil R. Bhavnani University of Wisconsin‐Madison
Alexander Lee University of Rochester
【摘要】
虽然许多国家基于平权法案（affirmative action）招募官僚，但很少有关于平权法案招募对官僚绩效的影响。一些人担心平权法案会降低新成员的素质，从而使官僚机构的表现恶化；而另一些人则认为，平权法案会提高新成员的表现，从而使其更能代表民众并更具回应性。我们借助印度精英官僚机构中详尽的招聘、背景和职业数据来验证这些可能性。我们考察了平权法案雇佣对地区层面实施MGNREGA世界上最大的反贫困项目的影响。数据表明，通过平权法案招募的来自弱势群体的成员表现并不比其他成员差。
Although many countries recruit bureaucrats using affirmative action, the effect of affirmative action recruits on bureaucratic performance has rarely been examined. Some worry that affirmative action worsens bureaucratic performance by diminishing the quality of recruits, whereas others posit that it improves performance by making recruits more representative of and responsive to the population. We test for these possibilities using unusually detailed data on the recruitment, background, and careers of India's elite bureaucracy. We examine the effect of affirmative action hires on district‐level implementation of MGNREGA, the world's largest anti‐poverty program. The data suggest that disadvantaged group members recruited via affirmative action perform no worse than others.
02 政策扩散：问题定义阶段
【题目】
Policy Diffusion: The Issue‐Definition Stage
【作者】
Fabrizio Gilardi University of Zurich
Charles R. Shipan University of Michigan
Bruno Wüest Forschungsstelle sotomo
【摘要】
本文提出了一种在政策扩散的背景下研究问题定义的新方法。政策扩散是指一个政府的政策制定影响其他政府政策制定的过程，目前对政策扩散的研究大多集中在政策采纳上。我们将焦点转移到该过程一个重要但被忽略的方面：问题定义阶段。我们使用主题模型来估计在此阶段如何构建策略，以及先前的策略采用如何预测这些框架。我们的分析基于1996年至2013年间美国49个州的报纸上超过52000段原始数据集，并重点关注各州的吸烟限制。我们发现，关于政策具体含义的框架可以通过其他州的先前采纳中行为预测，而关于政策的规范性论证框架则不然。我们的研究方法和研究结果为研究政策扩散提供了一个新的视角。
We put forward a new approach to studying issue definition within the context of policy diffusion. Most studies of policy diffusion—which is the process by which policymaking in one government affects policymaking in other governments—have focused on policy adoptions. We shift the focus to an important but neglected aspect of this process: the issue‐definition stage. We use topic models to estimate how policies are framed during this stage and how these frames are predicted by prior policy adoptions. Focusing on smoking restriction in U.S. states, our analysis draws upon an original data set of over 52,000 paragraphs from newspapers covering 49 states between 1996 and 2013. We find that frames regarding the policy's concrete implications are predicted by prior adoptions in other states, whereas frames regarding its normative justifications are not. Our approach and findings open the way for a new perspective to studying policy diffusion in many different areas.
03 取悦巨头：美国在世界银行政策制定中的影响力
【题目】
Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking
【作者】
Richard Clark Columbia University
Lindsay R. Dolan Wesleyan University
【摘要】
国际组织的政策如何反映强大的机构利益相关者的偏好？基于关于世界银行贷款条件中未被充分利用的数据集，我们发现在联合国投票支持美国的借款国被较少要求实施国内政策改革，同时改革也需要在有限的的和“较软”的议题领域实施。虽然美国的偏好渗透到世界银行的决策中，但我们没有发现借款国以贸易优惠换取美国积极干预的证据。相反，我们认为，当世界银行工作人员有意无意地设计与美国的偏好相适应的计划时，美国的影响力将间接发挥作用。我们的研究为世界银行政策受限制的问题提供了新的证据，并表明即使是自主的官僚机构也可能产出政治化的政策。
How do policies in international organizations reflect the preferences of powerful institutional stakeholders? Using an underutilized data set on the conditions associated with World Bank loans, we find that borrower countries that vote with the United States at the United Nations are required to enact fewer domestic policy reforms, and on fewer and softer issue areas. Though U.S. preferences permeate World Bank decision making, we do not find evidence that borrower countries trade favors in exchange for active U.S. intervention on their behalf. Instead, we propose that U.S. influence operates indirectly when World Bank staff—consciously or unconsciously—design programs that are compatible with U.S. preferences. Our study provides novel evidence of World Bank conditionality and shows that politicized policies can result even from autonomous bureaucracies.
04 真正胜利者的诅咒
【题目】
The Real Winner's Curse
【作者】
Leopoldo Fergusson Universidad de los Andes
Pablo Querubin New York University
Nelson A. Ruiz University of Oxford
Juan F. Vargas Universidad del Rosario
【摘要】
传统的民主理论认为，被排斥群体的政治代表权可以减少其参与冲突的动机并减少暴力。然而，当（1）精英利益受到新政治行为体的政策立场威胁时，以及（2）精英在行使暴力方面具有相对优势时，这一论点就忽视了他们的反应。借助不连续回归分析（regression discontinuity approach），我们证明此前被排除在外的左翼政党在哥伦比亚地方行政当局的选举险胜导致右翼准军事组织的暴力行动增加了一个标准差。我们将这种暴力激增解释为传统精英的反应，以抵消外来者获得正式政治权力机会的增加。与这种解释相一致，我们发现左翼游击队和其他行为者的暴力行为不受影响，而且右翼或其他新政党在势均力敌选举中的胜利也不会对政治暴力产生影响。
Traditional theories of democracy suggest that political representation of excluded groups can reduce their incentives to engage in conflict and lead to lower violence. However, this argument ignores the response of established elites when (1) their interests are threatened by the policy stance of new political actors and (2) elites have a comparative advantage in the exercise of violence. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the narrow election of previously excluded left‐wing parties to local executive office in Colombia results in a one standard deviation increase in violent events by right‐wing paramilitaries. We interpret this surge in violence as a reaction of traditional elites to offset the increase in outsiders' access to formal political power. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that violence by left‐wing guerrillas and other actors is unaffected and that violence is not influenced by the victory of right‐wing or other new parties in close elections.
05 供应链联系与扩大的碳联盟
【题目】
Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition
【作者】
Jared Cory University of Michigan
Michael Lerner University of Michigan
Iain Osgood University of Michigan
【摘要】
哪些公司反对采取行动应对气候变化？对下游客户进行采购和销售的网络应当传播并强化对二氧化碳直接排放者的反对。为检验这一说法，我们建立了美国支持和反对气候行动的公共政治活动的最大数据集，表明大多数反对气候行动的意见来自于排放量最高的行业之外。我们构建了关于企业碳强度的新度量方法，并表明通过碳密集型投入和向下游排放者碳交易所产生的政策风险可以解释来自非排放行业的巨大反对意见。美国66%的气候政策游说是由公开反对减少碳排放的公司、协会和其他团体组成的扩大联盟进行的。因此，公众对碳相关产业应对气候变化行动的反对是广泛的、高度组织化的，并伴随着广泛的游说行动。
Which firms oppose action to fight climate change? Networks of input sourcing and sales to downstream customers ought to propagate and reinforce opposition to decarbonization beyond direct emitters of CO2. To test this claim, we build the largest data set of public political activity for and against climate action in the United States, revealing that the majority of corporate opposition to climate action comes from outside the highest‐emitting industries. We construct new measures of the carbon intensity of firms and show that policy exposure via carbon‐intensive inputs and sales to downstream emitters explains this large volume of opposition from non‐emitting industries. Sixty‐six percent of U.S. lobbying on climate policy has been conducted by an extended coalition of firms, associations, and other groups that have publicly opposed reducing carbon emissions. Public opposition to climate action by carbon‐connected industries is therefore broad‐based, highly organized, and matched with extensive lobbying.
06 帮助朋友或影响敌人——竞选资金捐款的选举与政策影响
【题目】
Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions
【作者】
Keith E. Schnakenberg Washington University in St. Louis
Ian R. Turner Yale University
【摘要】
竞选献金可能会通过影响选举或影响在任政治家的选择而影响政策。为研究这两种路径之间的权衡，我们使用了一种博弈模型，其中献金可能会影响选举结果并向政治家传达与政策相关的信息。在该模型中，一名竞选献金捐赠者与每两名政治家各自拥有与世界状况相应政策相关的私人信息。捐赠者可以将其预算分配给具有相对相似偏好的盟友候选人，也可以分配给偏好与捐赠人偏好政策相对不同的温和派候选人。增加温和派当选可能性的捐款可以传达出捐赠者偏好政策的好消息，并影响温和派的政策选择的可能性。但是，当献金的选举效应太小而不足以要求足够高的成本来阻止具有负面信息的团体模仿时，这种信息效果就会崩溃。
Campaign finance contributions may influence policy by affecting elections or influencing the choices of politicians once in office. To study the trade‐offs between these two paths to influence, we use a game in which contributions may affect electoral outcomes and signal policy‐relevant information to politicians. In the model, a campaign donor and two politicians each possess private information correlated with a policy‐relevant state of the world. The donor may allocate his or her budget to either an ally candidate who has relatively similar preferences or a moderate candidate whose preferences are relatively divergent from the donor's preferred policy. Contributions that increase the likelihood of the moderate being elected can signal good news about the donor's preferred policy and influence the moderate's policy choice. However, when the electoral effect of contributions is too small to demand sufficiently high costs to deter imitation by groups with negative information, this informational effect breaks down.
07 精英互动和选民对政党政策立场的看法
【题目】
Elite Interactions and Voters’ Perceptions of Parties’ Policy Positions
【作者】
James Adams UC Davis
Simon Weschle Syracuse University
Christopher Wlezien University of Texas at Austin
【摘要】
最近的研究表明选民们推断执政联盟中的伙伴具有相似的意识形态——而不依赖于这些政党实际的政策声明。我们认为，公民是从更普遍的党派间合作和冲突形式中来评估政党立场，尤其是在全国大选之际。我们分析了成千上万的媒体报道——这些报道涉及2001年至2014年间来自13个西方民主国家的精英互动——并指出，在控制了联合政府的安排和政党选举宣言的政策基调之后，选民们推断公共关系合作程度更高的政党间的左右光谱一致性更高，但是这种“合作效应”只有在全国大选之际才明显。我们的发现对政党的政策形象和大众-精英的联系具有启示意义。
Recent research documents that voters infer that governing coalition partners share similar ideologies, independently of these parties’ actual policy statements. We argue that citizens estimate party positions from more general forms of interparty cooperation and conflict, particularly near the times of national elections. We analyze tens of thousands of media reports on elite interactions from 13 Western democracies between 2001 and 2014, and show that—controlling for coalition arrangements and for the policy tones of parties’ election manifestos—voters infer greater left–right agreement between pairs of parties that have more cooperative public relationships, but that this “cooperation effect” is only evident near the times of national elections. Our findings have implications for parties’ policy images and for mass–elite linkages.
08 丝绸之路的贸易与政治分裂：中国与东方伊斯兰世界之间历史交流的经济影响
【题目】
Trade and Political Fragmentation on the Silk Roads: The Economic Effects of Historical Exchange between China and the Muslim East
【作者】
Lisa Blaydes Stanford University
Christopher Paik New York University Abu Dhabi
【摘要】
横跨欧亚大陆的丝绸之路连接东西方已有数百年历史。在其鼎盛时期，贸易路线网络使商人们能够携带高价值的商品从中国前往地中海，这些商品的交易促进了城市的发展和繁荣。我们研究了城市中心在多大程度上因贸易路线的冲击而繁荣或衰落，特别是沿自然旅行路线的政治分裂。我们发现，通往阿勒颇和历史上著名的长安城（重要的跨区域贸易终点站）道路上的政治分裂破坏了城市发展。这些结论有助于我们了解中世纪和现代早期两个最发达的世界区域——中国和东方伊斯兰世界之间的交流，从而了解前现代国际体系的运作方式。
The Silk Roads stretched across Eurasia, connecting East and West for centuries. At its height, the network of trade routes enabled merchants to travel from China to the Mediterranean Sea, carrying with them high‐value commercial goods, the exchange of which encouraged urban growth and prosperity. We examine the extent to which urban centers thrived or withered as a function of shocks to trade routes, particularly political fragmentation along natural travel paths. We find that political fragmentation along the roads to Aleppo and historic Chang'an — major terminus locations for cross‐regional trade—damaged city growth. These conclusions contribute to our understanding of how a premodern international system operated through an examination of exchange between the two most developed world regions of the medieval and early modern periods, China and the Muslim East.
09 政治信息与信息寻求行为中的政党分歧：动机性推理还是“啦啦队”？
【题目】
Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information‐Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading?
【作者】
Erik Peterson Texas A&M University
Shanto Iyengar Stanford University
【摘要】
政党对政治相关事实的分歧、以及对获取这些事实信息来源的偏好，是代表了真实的意见分歧还是虚情假意的“啦啦队”式行为（cheerleading）？这个问题的答案对于理解党派两极分化的范围至关重要。我们通过实验在这些选项间进行测试，鼓励受访者正确回答问卷，并允许受访者在回答每个问题之前搜索信息。我们发现，政党的“啦啦队”虽然鼓吹夸大了事实信息，但只是适度的。激励措施对信息搜索中的政党分歧没有影响。当我们检验来自同一受访者的网络浏览数据时，这些差异与调查范围之外发生的差异没有什么不同。总体而言，我们的发现支持对错误信息的动机性推理解释。以志趣相投的方式寻找信息，并真诚地采用不正确的信念，从而为他们的政党增光添彩。
Do partisan disagreements over politically relevant facts, and preferences for the information sources from which to obtain them, represent genuine differences of opinion or insincere cheerleading? The answer to this question is crucial for understanding the scope of partisan polarization. We test between these alternatives with experiments that offer incentives for correct survey responses and allow respondents to search for information before answering each question. We find that partisan cheerleading inflates divides in factual information, but only modestly. Incentives have no impact on partisan divides in information search; these divides are no different from those that occur outside the survey context when we examine web‐browsing data from the same respondents. Overall, our findings support the motivated reasoning interpretation of misinformation; partisans seek out information with congenial slant and sincerely adopt inaccurate beliefs that cast their party in a favorable light.
10 恶治与人权——无（压制性）意图非法拘禁的案例
【题目】
Misgovernance and Human Rights: The Case of Illegal Detention without Intent
【作者】
Tara Slough New York University
Christopher Fariss University of Michigan
【摘要】
现有的关于侵犯人权的解释强调了镇压的战略逻辑。然而，由于国家机构的官僚动机失调，可能会在没有压制意图的情况下出现某些类型的暴行。为了将战略镇压与官僚激励措施分开，我们研究了海地刑事司法系统中国家工作人员对被非法审前拘留的被拘留者进行的随机、免费的法律援助干预的反应。法律援助解决了负责处理案件官员的道德风险问题。我们表明法律援助可以加速案件的进展与受害人的解放，同时证明了以下观点：司法系统中大规模侵犯人权的行为可能是由治理不善而非压制性意图造成的。
Existing explanations of human rights abuses emphasize a strategic logic of repression. Yet certain classes of abuses may arise absent the intent to repress because of the misaligned bureaucratic incentives of state agents. To separate accounts of strategic repression from bureaucratic incentives, we study the responses of state agents working within the Haitian criminal justice system to a randomized, free legal assistance intervention for detainees held in illegal pretrial detention. Legal assistance addresses moral hazard problems of the bureaucrats responsible for processing cases. We demonstrate that legal assistance accelerates case advancement and liberation, in line with the view that large‐scale human rights abuses in the justice system can result from poor governance and not repressive intent.
11 风险与麻烦——亚当·斯密论利润与资本主义的主角
【题目】
Risk and Trouble: Adam Smith on Profit and the Protagonists of Capitalism
【作者】
Roni Hirsch GIGA Harvard University
【摘要】
为了更好地解释日益加深的全球不平等，政治理论可以通过回答一个基本问题来极大地增进经验性和规范性工作什么是利润？但当涉及政治经济学问题时，理论家通常会从私有财产的概念开始思考。笔者认为，这掩盖了利润自18世纪以来作为资本主义社会组织类别的核心作用。基于生产和积累过程的动态和不确定性，利润取代了拥有所有权的公民和自然权利的主体，产生了新的社会主角——他们要求越来越不对称的回报。本文特别提醒人们注意一种危险的当代感觉，即认为利润本质上是无限的。作为一种可行的、稳健的替代方案，本文提出了亚当•斯密的利润定义，即利润是一种固定的、统一的比率，是对商业活动的生产性约束，能够塑造特质并通过广泛分配成本来防范风险。
To better account for deepening global inequalities, political theory could greatly enhance empirical and normative work by answering a fundamental question: What is profit? When engaging political‐economic questions, however, theorists often begin thinking from the concept of private property. This, I argue, has obscured the central role of profit as an organizing category for capitalist societies since the eighteenth century. Grounded in the dynamic and uncertain processes of production and accumulation, profit displaces the proprietary citizen and subject of natural rights and gives rise to new social protagonists, who lay claim to increasingly asymmetric rewards. In particular, the article calls attention to a dangerous contemporary sensibility, which sees profit as inherently unlimited. As a viable, robust alternative, it presents Adam Smith's idea of profit as a regular, uniform rate that acts as a productive constraint on business activity, shapes character, and safeguards against risk by widely distributing its costs.
12 何者驱动论证？基于目标的政治评价理论
【题目】
What Motivates Reasoning? A Theory of Goal‐Dependent Political Evaluation
【作者】
Eric Groenendyk University of Memphis
Yanna Krupnikov Stony Brook University
【摘要】
我们认为，驱动信息处理的是背景突显的任何目标，而不是在基线上表现出偏见或开放思维的论证。因此，如果政治让人感觉像是辩论，人们将被激励为自己的立场辩护；如果政治让人感觉像是深思熟虑，那么他们就会通过开放的思维过程来寻求共识。三个实验的结果表明：（1）政治引发的思考类似于冲突语境，而不同于协商语镜。（2）因此，带有“政治”标签的信息会激发反驳的动机，导致意见的两极化。没有这样的标签，就没有这样的动机，这解释了为什么偏见是普遍的而，不但是政治固有的。（3）尽管存在这种偏见能力，但只要让开放心态的价值凸显出来，人们就能被激发积极处理和接受与自身态度相反的信息。这表明，即使缺乏准确评估信息的动机，开放的话语也可能存在。最后，我们讨论了研究对政治话语的启示。
Rather than exhibiting bias or open‐minded reasoning at baseline, we argue that information processing is motivated by whatever goals a context makes salient. Thus, if politics feels like debate, people will be motivated to argue for their side. If politics feels like deliberation, they will be motivated to seek consensus through open‐minded processing. Results from three experiments demonstrate: (1) Politics evokes thoughts similar to conflictual contexts and dissimilar from deliberative contexts. (2) Consequently, information labeled “political” primes the motivation to counterargue, leading to opinion polarization. Absent such labeling, no such motivation is evident, explaining why bias is common but not inherent to politics. (3) Despite this capacity for bias, people can be motivated to actively process and accept counterattitudinal information by simply making the value of open‐mindedness salient. This suggests open‐minded discourse is possible even absent motivation to evaluate information accurately. We conclude by discussing the implications of our research for political discourse.
13 政治丑闻的一种理论
【题目】
Political Scandal: A Theory
【作者】
Wioletta Dziuda University of Chicago
William G. Howell University of Chicago
【摘要】
我们研究了一个模型，该模型描述了过去的不当行为成为当前丑闻的主题条件，这对于牵连的政客和与其共事的政党都将产生影响。在该模型中，真实和虚假的丑闻均产生于同一个涉及两个政党的政治框架内。在该框架内，两党要权衡继续与有污点嫌疑的政治家合作所带来的利益和可能的声誉损失。我们发现两党之间日益加剧的两极化增加了丑闻发生的可能性，同时也降低了其信息价值。我们还发现，仅由反对党引发的丑闻对双方的声誉都有损害——在某些情况下，还会让政治家的声誉有所提升。该模型还显示，丑闻很多的辖区并不一定会受到更多不当行为的困扰。实际上，在条件明确的情况下，丑闻可能是政治虔诚（political piety）的一种表现。
We study a model that characterizes the conditions under which past misbehavior becomes the subject of present scandal, with consequences for both the implicated politician and the parties that work with him. In the model, both authentic and fake scandals arise endogenously within a political framework involving two parties that trade off benefits of continued collaboration with a suspect politician against the possibility of reputational fallout. Rising polarization between the two parties, we show, increases the likelihood of scandal while decreasing its informational value. Scandals that are triggered by only the opposing party, we also find, are reputationally damaging to both parties and, in some instances, reputationally enhancing to the politician. The model also reveals that jurisdictions with lots of scandals are not necessarily beset by more misbehavior. Under well‐defined conditions, in fact, scandals can be a sign of political piety.
14 断层：官僚权力对选举问责制的影响
【题目】
Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability
【作者】
Lucy Martin University of North Carolina‐Chapel Hill
Pia J. Raffler Harvard University
【摘要】
本文提供了一种说明公民为何无法基于政府绩效投票的新解释。我们认为，当政治家控制官僚的能力有限时，公民将无从知晓政府的表现是否是现任者素质的良好信号。我们开发了一种选举模型，其中政策由政治家和官僚共同决定。当政治家对政策拥有不完全的权力时，选举在区分当政者的优劣方面表现得更差。基于对乌干达近9000名公民和地方官员进行的调查实验，我们检验了该理论的预测。我们发现，当公民和官员认为政治家相对于官僚拥有更多权力时，他们会将更多责任分配给前者。该责任分配会在选举中产生后果：当受访者认为官僚应对绩效负责时，他们不太可能期望政府的绩效会影响现任执政者的选票份额。
This article introduces a new explanation for why citizens may fail to vote based on government performance. We argue that when politicians have limited capacity to control bureaucrats, citizens will not know whether government performance is a good signal of the incumbent's quality. We develop a selection model of elections in which policy is jointly determined by a politician and a bureaucrat. When politicians have incomplete power over policy, elections perform worse at separating good and bad types of incumbents. We test the theory's predictions using survey experiments conducted with nearly 9,000 citizens and local officials in Uganda. We find that citizens and officials allocate more responsibility to politicians when they are perceived as having more power relative to bureaucrats. The allocation of responsibility has electoral consequences: When respondents believe that bureaucrats are responsible for performance, they are less likely to expect that government performance will affect incumbent vote share.
15 工会与白人种族政治
【题目】
Labor Unions and White Racial Politics
【作者】
Paul Frymer Princeton University
Jacob M. Grumbach University of Washington
【摘要】
学者和政治观察家指出，工会的衰落与白人身份政治的崛起是美国政治的两大深刻变化。然而，很少有人注意到这些力量之间的潜在反馈。在本文中，我们研究了工会成员身份在塑造白人种族态度中的作用。基于历史和美国政治发展的研究，我们提出了一种跨种族劳动政治理论，该理论认为工会会员资格减少了种族仇恨。横断面分析一致显示，白人工会成员的种族仇恨度较低，且更支持那些有利于非洲裔美国人的政策。更重要的是，我们的面板分析表明，在2010年至2016年期间，加入工会削弱了白人工人的种族仇恨。调查结果突出了工会在大众政治中的重要作用——更广泛地讲，组织成员对于政治态度和行为的重要性。
Scholars and political observers point to declining labor unions, on the one hand, and rising white identity politics, on the other, as profound changes in American politics. However, there has been little attention given to the potential feedback between these forces. In this article, we investigate the role of union membership in shaping white racial attitudes. We draw upon research in history and American political development to generate a theory of interracial labor politics, in which union membership reduces racial resentment. Cross‐sectional analyses consistently show that white union members have lower racial resentment and greater support for policies that benefit African Americans. More importantly, our panel analysis suggests that gaining union membership between 2010 and 2016 reduced racial resentment among white workers. The findings highlight the important role of labor unions in mass politics and, more broadly, the importance of organizational membership for political attitudes and behavior.
16 国事访问与领导人生存
【题目】
State Visits and Leader Survival
【作者】
Matt Malis New York University
Alastair Smith New York University
【摘要】
政治领导人为什么要出国访问？在本文中，我们提出了一种将个人化外交（in‐person diplomacy）与领导人生存联系起来的信息机制。外国当局对在任者进行外交访问的目的是获取未来的政策让步，而只有当在任者的掌权时间足以完成交易时才值得为访问付出努力。因此，外交访问提供了一个明显和可信的信号，表明访问者对现任总统的稳定非常有信心。面对有关现任总统实力的不完整信息，国内的反对者因为观察到了这一信号而不敢发起挑战。基于1960年至2013年间美国外交访问的数据，我们发现该预测受到了很强的经验支持：与美国总统进行外交访问大大降低了领导人被免职的风险。
Why do political leaders travel abroad? In this article, we propose an informational mechanism linking in‐person diplomacy to leader survival. A foreign power visits an incumbent in order to reap a future policy concession; the visit is only worth the effort if the incumbent remains in power long enough to deliver on the deal. A diplomatic visit thus provides a visible and credible signal of the visitor's high confidence in the incumbent's stability in office. Domestic opponents, facing incomplete information as to the incumbent's strength, observe the signal and are deterred from mounting a challenge. Using data on U.S. diplomatic visits from 1960 to 2013, we find strong empirical support for our predictions: A visit with the U.S. president substantially reduces the risk of a leader's removal from office.
翻 译：俞驰韬
校 对：周煜洋
相关阅读：
编辑：余亚维
一审：刘博涵
二审：袁 丁
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